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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROD N. TRIPLETT,

1

Plaintiff-Appellant,

i
it

-V-

FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief,
Driver License Services,
Department of Public Safety*
State of Utah,

Case No. 870043-CA

l
i
t

Category No. 13b

Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a driver license revocation after a
administrative hearing and a review ot the record in the Third
District Court of Utah.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2(a)-3(2)(a)•
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Whether it was arbitrary and capricious for the
bearing officer and court to rely on the proper functioning ot
the intoxilizer machine in the absence of evidence showing the
machine's reliability and accuracy aftqr the test in question.
2.

Whether the administrative agency and the District

Court may rely on the intoxilyzer test results as additional
evidence to the sworn testimony.
3. Also, is foundation testimony that the operator is
certified by the Department of Public Safety sutficient
foundational testing to admit the test results?

4.

Additionally, does sworn testimony that the State's

checklist was followed or that there was no problems with the
machine level credibility to establish enough foundation to admit
the machine printed test results before an administrative agency.
STATEMENT OF TCTK ffVSE

This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding*
The Third District Court Judgment a m r m e d the
Department of Public Safety's decision to revoke the petitioner's
driving privileges for 90 days.
In accordance with sections 41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20 and
based on sworn testimony and official documents, the Department
and reviewing District Court found that*
1.

(R. p.13)

The arresting officer had reasonable grounds to

believe that the petitioner was operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol; besides
2.

The petitioner consented to an intoxilyzer test

which gave a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .19 (T. at 4).
3.

The intoxilyzer machine was reliable and the

results admissible before the Department, pursuant to the
presumptions set forth in Utah Code Ann» S 41-6-44.5 and S 41-644.3, and Murray Citv v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983); X a c M
n,,h t,. Utah Liauor Control Comm.. 681 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1984).
4.

That there was other substantial and competent

evidence to support the Department's determination to revoke
petitioner's driving privileges.

2-

STATEMENT OF TH5 FACTS
U.C.A# S 41-2-20 provides for a review ot the
Department's documented records which contain the otficial DUI
Report forms and the transcript of the sworn testimony*

They

show that:
Rod N. Triplett (petitioner) was arrested for driving
an automobile while under the influence of alcohol on January 19,
1985.

The arresting officer, Wright, initially stopped the

petitioner for failing to stop at a red light.

(Def. Exhibit 2

p. 2 Addendum VI, p. A-17, Uniform DUI Report Form Sec. V.,
Defendants' Exhibit 1, Driver's License Transcript p.2).
After Officer Wright had stopped and approached the
petitioner's car he first detected, through the driver's open
window, an odor of alcohol in and about the vehicle.

Officer

Wright then asked to see the petitioner's drivers license and car
registration, which the petitioner provided in slow movements.
After this the petitioner was asked if he had been drinking
recently.

He stated that "he had had a couple of beers,"

(Addendum VI, p. A-16, DUI Report, Def. Exhibit 1, D.L. Tran. p.
3) .

The officer also testified that he saw an open pint

container of whiskey with approximately an ounce left in it (D.L.
Transcript p. 3-6, DUI Report) which Mr. Triplett later "threw
away" (Def. Exhibit 1, D.L. Transcript p. 6). Otficer Wright
requested that the petitioner submit to field sobriety tests, to
which petitioner consented.

Otficer Wright testified tnat he and

an additional officer, Carol McSain, saw that the petitioner was
unable to pass the field sobriety tests as instructed (D.L. Tran.
p. 6 ) .
-3-

Based on all of the circumstances and facts testified
to and reported, the administrator and Reviewing Court found tnat
Officer Wright had a reasonable belief that the petitioner was
driving under the influence of alcohol and placed him under
arrestr and requested that he submit to an intoxilyzer test.

He

consented and agreed to the test, and was transported to the West
Valley Police Station.
They also found that Officer Wright was a (1) certified
intoxilyzer machine operator (D»L. Tran. p.4) and (2) tnat he
followed the checklist in administering the test to the driver.
(Addendum VI, p. A-19, DUI Report Form, and Exhibit 2 Findings,
District Court Finding No. 5, Addendum VII, p. A-23).

Officer

Wright also testified and reported in writing tnat he read the
driver's license warnings to the petitioner prior to his taking
the test.
They both found, in addition that the test results
indicated a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .19% (Intoxilyzer
Record, Addendum VI, P. A-20 and D*L. Tran. p. 4)•
The petitioner was notified of the department's intent
to suspend his driving privileges and given notice of his right
to an administrative pre-suspension hearing pursuant to Section
41-2-19.6.

He made a timely request for a hearing and one was

conducted and documented.
At the bearing, sworn testimony as well as documentary
evidence was introduced including the (1) DDI Report Form, (2)
the O.H.P. Record o£ the Intoxilyzer Test and Affidavit showing
the machine was tested and working properly on January 15, 1985,
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and (3) Intoxilyzer Test Record showing a stamped and printed BAC
level of .19%. The intoxilyzer was tested and found to be
properiy operating four days previous to petitioner1s arrest.
Based on the evidence received at the hearing, the
Department determined that Officer Wright had reason to believe
tfiat the petitioner was driving while under the influence and in
addition that there was a test result indicating a BAC of .08% or
greater*

The Department accordingly suspended his privilege to

drive for 90 days and the Reviewing Court upheld that decision
(Addendum VII).

SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT
The arresting officer properly arrested the petitioner,
Rod N. Triplett, for driving under the influence of an
intoxicating substance*

His driving pattern, the late hour, the

odor of alcohol about his person, his admissions to drinking and
the whiskey in the vehicle as well as his poor performance on the
field sobriety tests all gave the officer reasonable grounds to
arrest the driver, warn him of possible consequences to his
driver's license, and request a chemical test.
At the ensuing pre-suspension hearing, the Department
of Public Safety properly took sworn testimony on the narrow
issue before it and received and considered the documentary
evidence presented, including the intoxilyzer test results
obtained by a certified operator.

The Department also properly

considered the foundational intoxilyzer test record affidavit,
showing that the machine was functioning properly four days prior
to the subject test.

The affidavit was received in the ordinary

•5-

course of business, regular on its face, and showed all indicia
of trustworthiness.

Therefore, a second technician's

foundational affidavit showing that the machine was functioning
properly after the subject test was unnecessary, illogical, and
not legally required*

The intoxilyzer machine under regulatory,

statutory, and case law is presumed to function properly for at
least a 40-day period, within which the petitioner's test was
administered.
Since the narrow scope of the civil public safety
statute, U.C.A. § 41-2-19.6, has been met and since a second
technician's affidavit showing the proper functioning ot the
intoxilyzer machine after petitioner's test is not necessary or
required} the hearing officer's decision in the administrative
hearing should not be viewed as arbitrary or capricious, nor the
opinion of the Reviewing Court—especially when there was
foundational and additional sworn evidence of substance on the
statutory issue ot "grounds to believe."
ARGUMENT

THE INTOXILYZER MACHINE IS LEGALLY
PRESUMED TO FUNCTION PROPERLY AND
FURTHER FOUNDATION IS UNNECESSARY
IN PRACTICALITY*
A notarized intoxilyzer atfidavit was introduced as
part of the Department of Public Safety's Official Records at
petitioner's pre-suspension hearing (Def. Exhibit 2, D.L, Tran.
at 2), Utah Rules of Evidence, 803(6) and (8). This document
shows that on January 15, 1985, four days prior to the
petitioner's arrest and test, the intoxilyzer machine was checked
-6-

and found to be functioning properly.

Two "breath test

technicians" tested the machine first hand and signed the
intoxilyzer affidavit verifying that the machine was working
properly, therefore there was a legal foundation for any breath
test results and the technician affidavit was admissible. ££&
Layton City v. Bennett.

p.2d

f

Ut. Ct. App. No. 87u038-CAf

slip op. at 3 (filed July 31, 1987).
Although this document and the operator's testimony
show tnat the intoxilyzer machine was actually and presumably
working properly a mere four days prior to the petitioner's test.
This, according to the petitioner, is insutficient to support the
suspension decision.

The facts, case law, and statute however,

clearly indicate otherwise.
In State v. Peterson. 100 Wash. 788, 674 P.2d 1251
(Wash. 1984), a criminal case, the Washington Supreme Court
addressed this same issue.

The defendant had submitted to a test

tnree days after the test machine had been checked and
calibrated, but no evidence was introduced to show that the
machine was functioning properly after the test. But the
Washington Supreme Court specifically ruled that such
"bookending" of the machine test was unnecessary.
Regulations which required breath testing machines to
be checked and calibrated at least once every tnree months were
significant to the Peterson court's legal reasoning.

The check

and calibration regulations existed prior to the passage of the
DDI law under which the defendant had been charged.

Thus the

Washington Legislature was presumed to have knowledge of the
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regulations.

Additionally, the regulations went unchanged after

passage of the new DUI law. Id. at 1253.

These regulations thus

allowed the Peterson court to find, for the purpose of criminal
DUI prosecutions, that the legislature had created a presumption
that the breath test machines would function properly for three
months. 1&. at 1254. Because the test machine had been checked
within three months prior to the defendant Peterson's test, the
court upheld the conviction. £d.

This Court should do the same.

Utah's regulations guiding the maintenance and
calibration of intoxilyzer machines require only tnat all
intoxilyzer machines be checked at least once every 40 days.
Further, these same regulations and time period were in effect
prior to the passage ot Section 41-2-19.6. ££& Respondent's
Brief Addendum IV.

This Court can therefore presume as in

Peterson, that the legislature had knowledge ot the 40-day
calibration and check requirement in enacting Section 41-2-19.6.
Logically and legally then, intoxilyzer machines in Utah are
presumed to be functioning properly for a 40-day period, or
between 40-day checks.
Additional case law from the State of Oregon reiterates
the Peterson courts'8 position that evidence concerning the
proper calibration of a intoxilyzer machine atter each test is
not necessary.

The fact tnat this authority comes from a

criminal proceeding in which burdens ot proot and admissibility
of evidence are more stringent lends even more support to this
civil proceeding.

In State v. Mattna. 77 Or. App. 219, 629 P.2d

845, 847, (Or. App. 1981) the Court said:
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ORS 487.815(3)(c) requires that breath
testing equipment be tested and
certified at least every sixty days • . .
and once the state demonstrates
compliance with the statutory requirement/

it is under no obligation to show the
condition of the equipment after its

US£/ the presumption of validity
extends for the 60-day period,
(emphasis added).
Although there is little case law which addressed the
issue of the necessity of before and after test certxtication of
intoxilyzer machines, the vast majority of state case law simply
requires states to follow their own statutes and regulations
regarding the tiae intervals for calibrating intoxilyzer
machines.

These cases either directly or indirectly focus their

attention primarily on whether the machine was calibrated within
the specified time period prior to a test, and didn't address the
issue ot calibration atter a test,

fuenning Yt Supert Ctt in and

for Maricopa County. 139 Ariz. 590, 680 P.2d 121 (Ariz. 1983);
££&£l£ V. BOWerS# 716 P.2d 471 (Colo. 1986)} State v. Liuafi. 1
Haw. App. 625f 623 P.2d 1271 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981); flcManusv .
SJLal£# 695 P.2d 884 (Olka. Ct. App. 1985); Murray Citv v. Hall.
663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), Addendum VIII.
The petitioner argues that Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-44.3
stands for "bookend calibrations" to insure tnat the machine was
properxy functioning.

A caretul reading of that section and the

following subsection D.C.A. S 41-6-44.5, show tnat it really
stanas for no such proposition.

However, since the arrest was at

0030 hours and the test results were at 0108 (Addendum VI, p. A16 and A-20) then suosection (1) would make the test results
"admissible evidence" in the Driver's License "proceeding."
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The

remainder of the section, subsection (4), makes the administrator
or judges the actual deciders of the accuracy of the test
procedures and admissibility of the results obtained (Addendum I,
p. A-3) • The Commissioner's Regulations, common sense, and the
Affidavit of the equipment technicians are still only guidelines
to the weight to be given the test results*

U.C.A. S41-6-

44.5(4).
The petitioner's sole authority in case law is Murray
CitY Yt Ball* 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983).

Murray City does not

stand for "bookend calibrations" of an intoxilyzer machine.
There is no mention of before and after test calibrations to
verify proper functioning of an intoxilyzer machine.

The Utah

Supreme Court in Murray City simply allows the convenient,
efficient, cost and time saving use ot technicians' affidavits
tnat are not solely conclusions but relate first hand checking
steps that were done (Addendum VII, p. A-27).

In that criminal

case the first hand attidavits are statutorily and
constitutionally allowed to be the sole foundation for a test
result that may be rebutted by the defendant (Addendum ViII, p.
A-28) • The driver in this case may also subpoena witnesses as
well, (U.C.A. S 41-2-19.5(5) Addendum I, p. A-l) but choose not
to.
In the absence of any case law requiring bookend
calibrations of an intoxilyzer machine, subsequent calibrations
or tests are legally and practically unnecessary especially
absent a showing that the machine or the test results are somehow
not trustworthy on this test.

The practical and legal
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presumption of accuracy and reliability of an intoxilyzer machine
is maintained by a pre-test calibration alone.
•Necessity," (Murray City). and experience! as well as
logic and the universally accepted design and acceptance of the
machine (Murray, Addendum VIII, p. A-26) dictates these
presumptions.

Legally, a pre-suspension hearing requested

pursuant to Section 41-2-19.6 is required within 30 days after
the arrest.

That 30-day requirement facilitates the statutory

purpose of quickly removing dangerous drivers from the road.
U.C.A. S 41-2-19.5.

It also may help the innocent driver by

disposing ot the matter quickly so that he or she may swiftly reobtain the license rather than continue to use the temporary
permit.

Practically, in almost all civil hearings such as this

one, a second "bookend" breath test machine attidavit will not be
available at the time of the bearing.

Thus, logic and legal

necessity also require tnat the presumption of accuracy be
accorded tests from machines checked within a 40-day period.
As a practical consideration this machine and others
are all used by "certified operators."

That means they have

taken hours of training and had practical experience with the
machines and the subjects.

This operator not only testified that

he was certified but also marked on his DUI Report that the usual
checklist recommended by the manufacturer and the Commissioner
were used (Exhibit 2, DUI Report p. 4). The operator-otficer, as
well as the hearing examiner have the experience and common
knowledge that the machine will not print the results or show an
error indicator light if the machine is not functioning

11-

accurately*

In fact, training, experience, and the knowledge is

that the machines are mechanically designed and built to show any
malfunction at the test (Addendum IV and V, p. A-ll).

There is

an error light on all machines (Addendum II, p. A-4 and A-5).
Thereroref absent any proot to the contrary, realistically it is
a common known fact tftat preponderates that the machine and the
results printed are extremely reliable.

This Court should also

uphold that practical presumption made by the designers,
manufacturers, Commissioner, and users of this valuable tooll
The Department Records and Transcript of the sworn
testimony were that this test was done by a (1) certified
operator and (2) the State's checklist was followed (Def. Exnibit
2, and D.L. Tran. p. 4 ) • In Colorado, the Appeals Court presumes
a departmental prima facie case if there is a checklist used,
Anltman v. M.V.D.« 706 P.2d 5, 6 (Colo. App. 1985).

Even absent

a documented checklist or testimony tnat it was used, the fact
that the test was done by a certified operator led the Colorado
Court to say:
We agree with the holdings in State v.
RuZh, 595 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. App. 1980), and,
accordingly, hold that the burden is not
on the state in a case of this kind (a
driver's license revocation) to establish
by a current inspection and certitication
that a breath testing device pertormed
accurately; see also State Dept. of

Public Safety v. Habischr 313 N.w.2d 13
(Minn. 1981)•
The Court then later in Malone v. Colo. Deot. of Motor Vehicles.
707 P.2d 363, 364 (Colo. App. 1985) statedi
When there is evidence that a breath
testing device is operated by one certified
-12-

to use it and that the test is administered
in accordance with division of health
regulations, a prima facie case for the
introduction of breath test results is
established, (citation omitted).
We hold tnat this testimony is
sufficient to support the hearing officers
decision, even in the absence of the
operational checklist. (Emphasis added).
Therefore, even absent a checklist or a technician's
testing affidavit, the fact that the uncontradicted testimony was
that the results were obtained by a certified operator should
establish * a prima facie case for the introduction of breath
test results.•
In this case, the test machine was obviously and
unrefutably checked just four days prior to the test at issue.
It was checked well within the 40 days allowed by the
regulations. Because the machine was checked within this 40-day
period, it was functioning in all legal, logical, and practical
senses when the appellant's breath sample was taken.

Since the

intoxilyzer machine is legally and practically presumed to be
functioning properly at the time of the appellant's test, the
Department and District Court could therefore rely on the .19%
BAC results in suspending the appellant's license.

POINT II
THE HEARING OFFICER WAS NOT ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS IN REVOKING PETITIONERS
DRIVING PRIVILEGES.
The petitioner bases his argument concerning the
arbitrary and capricious manner in which the hearing otficer and
the District Court suspended his license, solely on the hearing
examiner's refusal to require before and after test affidavits

-13

verifying the proper functioning of the intoxilyzer machine.
(Appeal Brief and Docketing Statement).
Arbitrary seems to mean "with no basis at all," and
capricious means "on a whim."

(Websters Dictionary).

However,

the Administrative Examiner and the District Court had
substantial "evidence of substance" showing the arresting otticer
had grounas to believe the appellant had been driving while under
the influence.

Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n,

658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983).
It was a narrow issue.

The testimony and documents of

a driving pattern, admissions, personal observations, field
sobriety tests, all in addition to the corroborating, trustwortny
test results, certainly cannot and should not be deemed to be
unreliable by this Court.

Nor would reason, logic, or common

sense dictate to this Court tftat the Administrative Examiner or
the District Court was arbitrary and capricious.

CONCLUSION
The hearing otticer was not arbitrary and capricious in
retusing to consider "bookend affidavits" since it is not
required by the regulations governing such matters.

Tnere is no

case law or statute that purports to hold such a view.
Additionally, the idea would be administratively cumbersome and
expensive, in the absence ot a contrary showing of unreliability.
The respondent, Department of Public Safety, Driver
License Division theretore respectfully requests that this Court
arrlrm the trial court and specitically reattirm tnat bookend
technician's affidavits to demonstrate a foundation to the

14-

accuracy ot an intoxilyzer machine is practically unnecessary and
not required by law.
DATED this

/(S

day ot August, 1987.

DAVID L

LKINSON
neral

M. BALE
Assistant Attorney General
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I hereby certify tnat four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief ot Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. Metropolitan Law Building, 431 South 300
East, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
August, 1987.
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ADDENDUM I
Motor Vehicle Statutes Emphasized

Vehicle*'
safety hazards by driving with a blood alcohol
content above a certain level or while under the
influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of
alcohol and any drug or by refusing to take a chemical test that complies with the requirements of
section 41444.10.
tm
41-M9.6. Chemical lest - Groaads aad
procedure for officer's request • Taking Kcease
• Report to departmeat • Procedure by
department • Suspension.
. (1) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds
to believe that a person may be violating or has
violated section 414-44 the peace officer may, in
connection with his arrest of the person, request the
person to submit to a chemical test to be administered in compliance with the standards set forth in
section 41444.10.
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior
to the person's submission to a chemical test that
results indicating .OS9?* or more by weight of alcohol
in the blood shall, and the existence of a blood
alcohol content sufficient to render the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle can, result in suspension or revocation of the person's license or
privilege to operate a motor vehicle.
(3) If the person submits to that chemical test
and the results indicate a blood alcohol content of
.08Vt or more, or it the officer makes a determination, based on reasonable grounds to believe that
the determination is correct, that the person is otherwise in violation of section 41-6-44, the officer
directing administration of the test or making the
determination shall serve on the person, on behalf
of the department, immediate notice of the department's intention to suspend the person's privilege
or license to drive. If the officer serves that immediate notice on behalf of the department he shall
take the Utah driver license or certificate or permit,
if any, of the driver, issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days, and supply to the driver, on
a form to be approved by the department, basic
information regarding how to obtain a prompt
hearing before the department. A citation issued by
the officer may, if approved as to form by the
department, serve also as the temporary license.
(4) The peace officer serving the notice shall
send to the department within five days after the
date of arrest and service of the notice the person's
license along with a copy of the citation issued regarding the offense, and a sworn report indicating
the chemical test results, if any, and any other basis
for the officer's determination that the person has
violated section 41444, and the officer's belief
regarding the person's violation of section 41444. Each such report shall be on a form approved
by the department and shall be endorsed by the
police chief or his equivalent or by a person authorized by him, other than the officer serving the
notice.
(5) Upon written request of a person who has
been issued a 30-day license, the department shall
grant to the person an opportunity to be heard
within 30 days after the date of arrest and issuance
of the 30-day license, but the request must be
made within 10 days of the date of the arrest and
issuance of the 30-day license. A hearing, if held,
shall be before the department in the county in
which the arrest occurred, unless the department
and the person agree that the hearing may be held in
some other county. The hearing shall be documented and its scope sb^]| cover the issues of whether a
peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the
*£L\£*

•1VS3

41-2-21. New license after revocation.

(1) Any person whose license has been revoked
under this act shall not be entitled to apply for or
receive any new license until the expiration of one
year from the date such former license was revoked
or longer as provided in sections 41-2-18 and 412-19. Licenses which have been revoked may not
be renewed, but application for a new license must
be filed as provided in section 41-24, and a
license so issued shall be subject to all of the provisions of an original license. The department shall
not grant the license until jsn investigation of the
character, abilities and habits' of the driver has been
made to indicate whether it will be safe to again
grant him the privilege of using the highways.. *<
(2) Any resident or nonresident whose operator's license to operate a motor vehicle in this state
has been suspended or revoked as provided in this
act shall not operate a motor vehicle in this state
under a license, permit, or registration certificate
issued by any other jurisdiction or otherwise during
such suspension or after such revocation until a new
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person to have been operating a motor vehicle in
violation of section 41444, whether the person
refused to submit to the test, and the test results. If
any. In connection with a hearing the department or
its duly authorized agent may administer, oaths and
may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses
and the production of relevant books and papenT"
One or more members of the department may
conduct the hearing, and any decision made after a
hearing before any dumber of the members of the
department shall be as valid as if made after «
hearing before the full membership of the department. After the hearing, the department shall order,
either that the person's license or privilege to drive
be suspended or that it not be suspended. A first
suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under
this subsection, shall be for a period of 90 days, .
beginning on the 31st day after the date of the
arrest. A second or subsequent suspension under
this subsection shall be for a period of 120 days,
beginning on the 31st day after the date of arrest.
The department shall assess against a person, in
addition to any fee imposed under subsection 41-28(7), a fee of S25, which must be paid before the
person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover
administrative costs, and which fee shall be canceled
if the person obtains an unappealed departmenthearing or court decision that the suspension was
not proper. A person whose license has been suspended by the department under this subsection may
file a petition within 30 days after the suspension
for a hearing in the matter which, if held, shall be
governed by the provisions of section 41-2-20.
tfas
41-2-20. Judicial review of license cancellation,
revocation or suspension • Scope of review.
Any person denied a license or whose license his
been canceled, suspended or revoked by the department except where such cancellation or revocation
is mandatory under the provisions of this act unless
the suspension occurred pursuant to section 41-219.6 shall have the right to file a petition within
thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in
a court of record in the county wherein such person
shall reside and such court is hereby vested with
jurisdiction and it shall be its duty to set the matter
for hearing upon ten days' written notice to the
department. The court's jurisdiction is limited to a
review of the record to determine whether or not the
department's decision was arbitrary or capricious.
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41-444.5. Ad•UMlbOity of cWmJcnf m t malts la
• actions for driving under the influence er wita a
prohibited blood ikokot collect - Wright.
41-6-44.1. Municipal Bttoraeys autnoriied to proaecate

emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or
require the person to work in a cxmim unity-service
Work program for not less than 24 hours nor more
than 50 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence
Or the work in the community-service work
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol
Program, order the person to participate in an ass*' or drag - Refusnl to allow - Warning, report,
v
revocation of neense - Court actio* on revocation •
essment and educational series at.a licensed alcohol
Person Incapable of refusal - Results of test available rehabilitation facility.
' Who may give lest - Evidence.
. (5Xt) Upon a second conviction within five yean
411-6-44.20. Drinking alcoholic hevemge tad ope*
tfier a first conviction under this section or under a
containers In motor vehicle prohibited • Definitions fecal ordinance similar to this section adopted in
. Exception* . Penalty for violation.
compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court
411-6-44 JO. Sdrure and impoundment of vehicles by ,
shall, in addition to the penalties provided for in
category 1 peace officer*. *
Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jafl sentence of
4114-45. Reckless drlvlag * Penalty.
not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than
?20 hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk
411-6-43. Local ordinance* fo be consistent with
tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a
code.
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority Community-service work program for not less than
that governs a person's driving or being in actual &0 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition
physical control of a motor vehicle while having to the jail sentence or the work in the communityalcohol in the blood or while under the influence of Service work program, order the person to particialcohol or any drug or the combined influence of pate in an assessment and educational series at a
alcohol and any drug, or that governs, in relation to licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. The court
any of those matters, the use of a chemical test or ttiay, in its discretion, order the person to obtain
chemical tests, or evidentiary presumptions, or treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. . .,.
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five
penalties or that governs any combination of those
matters, shall be consistent with the provisions in years after a second conviction under this section or
Under a local ordinance similar to this section
this code which govern those marten.
,"'". (2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-645(1), the court shall, in addition to the penalties
/&?/ £&Per/?j /erk)&j &?>?/?& &r ds?y}#£ * vMcte }/?
Provided
for in Subsection (3), impose a mandatory
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of Jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than
}, 160 hours with emphasis on serving in the .drunk
!
Ibis code which govern those matters. v
w»
/
tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a
41-6-43.10. Repealed.
' ' ' .'* * ym Community-service work project .for not-less than
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol
«U0 nor more than 720 hours and, in addition to the
or drug or with high blood alcohol content •
iail sentence or work in the community-service
Criminal punishment - Arrest without warrant
work program, order the person to obtain treatment
• Suspension or revocation of license.
•4 an alcohol rehabilitation facility. ....... i • :-,~.
(1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under
this section for any person with a blood alcohol Subsection (3) may be suspended and the convicted
content of .08 ^ii or greater by weight, or who is Person is not eligible for parole or probation until
under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the *ny sentence imposed under this section has been
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a *erved. Probation or parole resulting from a convidegree which renders the person incapable of safely ction for a violation of this section or a local ordidriving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical nance similar to this section adopted in compliance
control of a vehicle within this state. The fact that a with Subsection 41-6-43(1) may not be \ terminated
person charged with violating this section is or has *nd the department may not reinstate aay license
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug does Suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction,
not constitute a defense against, any charge of viol- if it is a second or subsequent conviction within five
ating this section.
.
" ^
years, until the convicted person has furnished evi1
(2) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall dence satisfactory to the department that all fines
be based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred *nd fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilcubic centimeters of blood.
;: '
itation costs, assessed against the person, have bees
(3Xa) Every person who is convicted the first rime P a i d .
...
%
. ' V r r . .-*•»«, * , . V.
of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B
. (6Xa) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5)
J7»j3t/7>£27>£>rt' )mp7?S£>2>J7>t/» J>>£) bt Jl>? JW>/ ft Wf7
*h*t require z. sentencing court Co order € coavicUfd
than 60 days. But if the person has inflicted a bodily Person to participate in an assessment and educatiinjury upon another as a proximate result of having onal series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation {apoperated the vehicle in a negligent manner, he is Uty, obtain, in the discretion of the court, treatment
guilty of a class A misdemeanor; any imprisonment *4 an alcohol rehabilitation facility/ Qr '.obtain*
in the county jail shall be for not more, than one Mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation
year.
'.•...->; <"< -.. r,\
\ facility, or do any combination of those things,
(b) For the purposes of this section, the stan- *pply to a conviction for a violation of Section. 41dard of negligence is that Of simple negligence, the $-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsfailure to exercise that degree of care which an ection (7), so as to require the court to render the
ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises *ame order regarding education or treatment at an
under like or similar circumstances. '.
'' '' .'*
*Jcohol rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection
(4) In addition to the penalties provided in Subs- Vith a first, second, or subsequent conviction under
ection (3), the court shall, upon a fust conviction, Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 Under Subsection (7), as he woulfl render in cbnne:
consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with *tion with applying respectively, the first, second, or
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subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections
41-6-44(4) and (5).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a
conviction under Section 41-6-45 which qualified
as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a first,
second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous conviction under either Section 41644 or 41-645 Is deemed a prior conviction.
Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-b*sed or other education program provided
for in this section shall be approved by the Department of Social Services.
'« • .*
V
(7Xa) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of
guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of
Section 41-645 or of an ordinance enacted pursuant to Subsection 41 -643(b) in satisfaction of,
or as a substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for
the record a factual basis for the plea, including
whether or not there had been consumption of
alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant in connection with the offense. The statement shall be an offer of proof of the facts which
shows whether. or not there was consumption of
alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant, in connection with the offense.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of
the consequences of a violation of Section 41-645 as follows: If the court accepts the defendant's
plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of violating
Section 41-645, and the prosecutor states for the
record that there was consumption of alcohol or
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant
in connection with the offense, the resulting conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
(c) The court shall notify the department of
each conviction of Section 41-645 which is a
prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest
a person for a violation of this section when the
officer has probable cause to believe the violation
has occurred] although not in his presence, and if
the officer has probable cause to believe that the
violation was committed by the person. . • *
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend
for 90 days the operator's license of any person
convicted for the first time under Subsection (1),
and shall revoke for one year the license of any
person otherwise convicted under this section, except
that the department may subtract from any suspension period the number of days for which a license
was previously suspended under Section 41-2-19.6
if the previous suspension was based on the same
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is
based.
. ms
41-644.2. Repealed.
my
41444 J . Standards for chemical breath analysis
-Evidence.
* (1) The commissioner of public safety shall establish standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath
including standards of training.
• ~ (2) In any action or proceeding in which it is
material to prove that a person was driving or in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or driving with a blood alcohol
content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as
memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events
to prove that the analysis was made and the instrument used was accurate, according to standards
CodfCc

established in subsection (1) shall be admissible if:
(a) The judge finds that they were made in
the regular course of the investigation at or about
the time of the act, condition or event; and
(b) The source of information from which
made and the method and circumstances of their
preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under subsection (1) and the conditions of
subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption
that the test results are valid and further foundation
for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary
no
41444.5. Admissibility of chemical test results la
actions for driving aoder the influence or with a
prohibited blood alcohol contest - Weight.
(1) In any action or proceeding in which it is
material to prove that a person was driving or in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or with a blood alcohol content
statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical test
or tests as authorized in section 41-644.10 shall
be admissible as evidence.
(2) If the chemical test was taken within two.
hours of the alleged driving or actual physical
control, the blood alcohol level of the person at the
time of the alleged driving or actual physical control
shall be presumed to be not less than the level of the
alcohol determined to be in the blood by the chemical test.
(3) If the chemical test was taken more than
two hours after the alleged driving or actual physical
control, the test result shall be admissible as evidence of the person's blood alcohol level at the time
of the alleged driving or actual physical control, but
the trier of fact shall determine what weight shall be
given to the result of the test.
(4) The foregoing provisions of this section
shall not prevent a court from receiving otherwise
admissible evidence, as to a defendant's blood
alcohol level at the time of the alleged driving or
actual physical control.
Has
41-644.8. Municipal attorneys authorized to
prosecute for driving while license suspended or
revoked.
Alleged violations of section 41-2-28, which
consist of the person driving while his operator's or
chauffeur's license is suspended or revoked for a
violation of section 41-644, a local ordinance
which complies with the requirements of section 416-43, section 41-644.10. section 76-5-207, or
a criminal prohibition that the person was charged
with violating as a result of a plea bargain after
having been originally charged with violating one or
more of those sections or ordinances, may be prosecuted by attorneys of cities and towns as well as by
prosecutors who are empowered elsewhere in this
code to prosecute those alleged violations.
ms
41-644.10. Implied consent to chemical tests tor
alcohol or drug - Refusal to allow • Warning,
report, revocation of license • Court action on
revocation - Person incapible of refusal Results of test available • Who may five test •
Evidence.
(1) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine
for the purpose of determining whether he was
driving or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of
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ADDENDUM II
Manufacturers and U.H.P. Intoxiiyzer Pictures With Labels
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ADDENDUM III
Excerpts From Manufacturers Operators Manual

INTOXILYZER
Electronic Alcohol-ln-Breath Tester

Operators Manual

Model 4011AS&A

Model 4011AS-A

CMI, Incorporated
A Stbsfcfery of Federal Signal Corporation
Signal Dtobn

AU?

256A506
1182

CMI INTOXILYZER
MODEL 4011A and 4011AS

DESCRIPTION
The CMI INTOXILYZER is designed to be operated at 115
Volts/60Hz AC, but may be ordered with an international
option.
The instrument
requires approximately
250
watts of power.
The heart of the INTOXILYZER, the sample cell, utilizes
a technique called "infrared absorption".
Infrared
light from a highly stabilzed light source is modulated, then collimated by fused silica lenses and
directed through the sample cell. Every molecule absorbs light of a specific wave length depending on the
physical size ana structure of that molecule.
The
INTOXILYZER measures alcohol in breath by detecting the
decrease
in
intensity
of
infrared
energy
passing
through the breath sample.
At the other end of the
cell," a second set of fused silica optics focuses the
energy onto the face of an infrared detector. As the
concentration of alcohol vapor increases in the cell,
the amount of infrared energy reaching the detector
falls in a predictable, exponential manner.
The signal detected is electronically filtered at the
source modulation frequency, and then is processed and
converted from an AC to a DC signal. This DC analogue
signal, which is a representation of the exponential
relationship between the energy transmitted through the
cell and the concentration of alcohol in the cell* is
linearized by a signal processing unit, and then digitized and displayed on a digital panel meter directly
as per cent blood alcohol*
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TABLE 1:
No.

CONTROLS & INDICATORS
Item

Description

1

Power Switch

A
two
position
toggle
switch
that
applies AC
power to the instrument
when set on "on".

2

Power Indicator

A yellow LED that lights
when the power switch is
in the "on" position.

3

Ready Indicator

A green LED that lights
when the sample cell has
been heated to the proper
temperature.

4

Cycle Complete
Indicator

A yellow LED that lights
when the proper timing
cycles
have
been
completed in the Air Blank,
Breath,
and
Calibrate
test
positions
of
the
Mode Selector Switch.

5

Breath Strength
Indicator

A green lamp that lights
when
a
proper
breath
sample is being given.
A red LED that
lights
when the operator has not
properly oper- ated the
instrument.

6

Error Indicator

LED * Light Emitting Diode

A<\

BREATH SAMPLING SYSTEM
INTOXILYZER 4011A and 4011AS utilize a breath sampling
system which allows individuals of varying lung capacity to easily corplete a test. This system looks at
the rate of rise of the digital readout as the person
under test is blowing into the instrument to ascertain
the wdeep lung" nature of the breath sample. The person under test must light the green breath lamp for a
minimum of 3 1/2 to 4 seconds and continue blowing
until a level readout has been reached in order for the
instrument to print. The end result is a system that
is both tamperproof and easier to use, in that it
covers much more effectively, the broad range of lung
capacities found in subjects under test. As such, test
time will vary from 4 to 5 seconds for a small lunged
individual and up to 10 to 15 seconds for a large
lunged individual.
Average test time is 7 seconds.
The capability of the INTOXILYZER to instantaneously
analyze the breath of the person under test makes this
system possible, indeed allowing one to obtain a more
"human factored" breath sample.
The officer need
merely tell the subject to take a deep breath and blow.
"S" OPTION
The INTOXILYZER Model 4011AS is a technical answer to
the question of acetone sensitivity in an infrared
instrument which analyzes breath alcohol in the 3.39
micron absorption band.
The Model 4011AS is a standard Model 4011A INTOXILYZER
which has been manufactured with the "S" option. All
operating controls and procedures are identical to
those of the Model 4011A. The only outward indication
of the "S" option is the addition of a red front panel
indicator labeled "Interference"*

-9-
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ADDENDUM IV
Utah Department of Public Safety Operators Manual Excerpts

CHAPTER VIII
INTOXILYZER OPERATION!
The Intoxilyzer was first produced in 1972 by Omicron Corporation from
California. It was purchased by CMI Corporation of Colorado who perfected and
now produce it.
The CMI Intoxilyzer offers law enforcement agencies a practical aid in
their fight against the nation1s leading causes of highway fatalities-the
drinking driver.
It is an answer to many of the problems previously encountered by other
breath testing instruments.
The Intoxilyzer is:
Quick and easy to operate.
It is safe to operate because the operator does not have to handle
any chemicals.
It gives a permanent record.
It has an established legal record.
It is highly reliable because it is tamper proof.
J^^S^JBJ^^
procedi^^
"^""~~"
^-—There is nothing magical about the way the Intoxilyzer works. Its design
is based on sound Chemico-Physical Law.
Very simply—it operates on what is called an Infrared Absorption Process
which means that alcohol laden breath is introduced into a chamber and
infrared light is passed through it. The instrument computes how much light
has been absorbed and reads it out on a digital display.
CMI INTOXILYZER
Model 4011AS and 4011AS+A
DESCRIPTION
The CMI Intoxilyzer is designed to be operated at 115 Volts/60Hz AC, but may
be ordered with an international option. The instrument requires approximately 250 watts of power.
The heart of the Intoxilyzer, the sample cell, utilizes a technique called
"infrared absorption11. Infrared light from a highly stabilized light source
is modulated, then collimated by fused silica lenses and directed through the
sample cell. Every molecule absorbs light of a specific wave length depending
on the physical size and structure of that molecule. The INTOXILYZER measures
alcohol in breath by detecting the decrease in intensity of infrared energy
passing through the breath sample. At the other end of the cell, a second set
of fusea silica optics focuses the energy onto the face of an infrared
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detector. As the concentration of alcohol vapor increases in the cell, the
amount of infrared energy reaching the detector falls in a predictable,
exponential manner.
The signal detected is electronically filtered at the source modulation
frequency, and then is processed and converted from an AC to a DC signal.
This DC analogue signal, which is a representation of the exponential
relationship between the energy transmitted through the cell and the
concentration of alcohol in the cell, is linearized by a signal processing
unit, and then digitized and displayed on a digital panel meter directly as
per cent blood alcohol.
The INT0XILY2ER Model 4011 AS has four operational modes:
1. Zero Set

In this mode, the operator adjusts the Zero
Adjust Knob until the digital panel reads a
positive .000, .001, .002, or .003.

2. Air Blank

When the internal air pump is connected to the
breath tube, the sample cell is cleared automatically.

3. Breath

This mode is used when a subject is tested
for alcohol in his breath.

4.

When the operator wishes to check the instrument
against a standard alcohol solution, the internal
pump is connected to the input of a simulator containing this solution, and the breath tube is
connected to the output of the simulator. In
Calibrate Mode, the air pump will fill the sample
cell with the reference vapor. (Refer to special
instructions accompanying the "Beam Attenuator"
when using this calibration option.)

Calibrate
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ADDENDUM V
Utah Breath Testing Regulations Excerpts

Archives file #3531
Revised: April 1, 1981
Archives f1le# 4714
BREATH TESTING KEGUIATIONS

DEPARTMENT Of VUBLK

Revised: November 4,,1983"
Archives f1le# 6734

SAFETY

*
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ComliiiontA.

TESTS FOR CHECKING CALIBRATION
A.

Breath testing instruments must be certified on a routine basis
not to exceed forty (40) days.

B.

Calibration tests must be performed by a technician using appropriate solutions of ethyl alcohol, and using methods and techniques for
checking calibration recommended by the manufacturer of the
instrument or the office of the Commissioner of Public Safety.

C.

Results of test for calibration shall be kept in a permanent record
book.

A report of each calibration test shall be recorded on the

appropriate form and sent to the supervisor of the Breath Testing
Program. The supervisor of the Breath Testing Program is hereby
designated as the official keeper of said records.
PROCEDURE FOR CERTIFICATION OF INSTRUMENTS
A.

Breathalyzer
1.

Instrument heating properly:
a.

2.

3.

between 47 and 53 degrees centigrade

Collection chamber output:
a.

COLD between 55 and 58 cc's

b.

WARM between 50 and 54 cc"s

NULL meter functioning properly:
a.

Must be able to achieve a balance and swing freely in both
directions.

Am

INTOXILYZER - BREATHALYZER OPERATOR TRAINING

A.

Training for original certification is to be conducted by a Breath
Test Technician and should include the following:
1 hour.. .Welcome, registration, preview of Alcohol and Traffic Safety.
3 hours. .Effects of Alcohol in the Human Body.
3 hours. .Operational Principles of Breath Testing.
2 hours..Alcoholic Influence Report Form.
2 hours..Testimony of the Arresting Officer.
3 hours. .Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing.
1 hour.. .Detecting the Drinking Driver.
8 X hours..Laboratory Participation.

(Running Simulator tests on the

instruments and tests on actual drinking subjects).
1 hour.• .Examination and Critiques of Course.

3
B.

V

Ho^K

PASS

Training for recertification is to be conducted by a Breath Testing
Technician and should include the following:
2 hours. .Effects of alcohol in the Human Body.
2 hours. .Operational principles of Breath Testing.
1 hour.. .Alcohol Influence Report Form and Testimony of arresting officer.
2 hours..Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing and Detecting and the
Drinking Driver.
1 hour . . . E x a m .

C.

Anyone having previously successfully completed a twenty-four (24)
hour operators school, may be recertified at anytime by successfully
completing an eight (8) hour recertification course, and also may be
certified to operate another type of breath testing instrument after
eight (8) hours instruction pertaining to the instrument in question.
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ADDENDUM VI
DUI Report Form and Intoxilyzer Results Printout Card

DUI REPORT FORM
CASE IDENTIFICA
IFICAJION:
^
Date /./£? -ft* D|y &&f
Accldent_
Case #j£5~Z**f!j&_Time Prepared.
/hAAjjy*
Address
-flkg^g^ftgg
Subject's Name /»&
AJ. -TZ/St&rf
Place of Employment (/*/***/ /tofsfsf _^ .
Address
Home Telephone Number «P3T9~ %/^40
work Telephone Numoer
*fi3A
D.O.B. ' / ? - 3 A ^ ^
Driver License * /VfrfS7¥/3~T\mi>
of Arrest
Place nf Arrest <^»/9>J g X ^ S
Charges ^ / / > / £ - £
Arresting Officer {jJAyAAtr
Assisting Officers.
Y&
Arresting Agency (jJfxr
ifayj^j
II.

VEHICLE:

Year

/ffi?^

Color__
License* and state $S£
%£$
Registered Owner,

III.

A *fc
^

^>?S

A

9*4

Model.
Make.
Disposition / / w A
tf^/h£&
Address .C5~<^9 S / / S / 3 * ^

WITNESSES: (If passengers, indicate specifically)
Name
Address

Age/DOB

Tele. #

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

to
to

©

IV.

ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL
The facts establishing the subject's actual physical control of a motor vehicle arerr

V.

DRIVING PATTERN:
/
Subject's location when first observed wen** Bcto*
The facts observed
\6 regarding
r/garding driving pattern: <ij^>/^f'r'

VI.

£XUJ

<S£*£u/

f/c£)

AtolR

U&i

PRE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT:
fJDriGj/

VII.

Time:

r*

**J&

/;«, HM,

?

&AJ4S**J-S*>^

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Odor of alcoholic beverage
i/i^S
Speech
f y ourt^h
Balance feti/,.
Signs or complaints of injury or illness
Other physical characteristics /^S^&h>.

lUO
4)/ t . t .

/ A J MUs/AT-

TTZAJ^J:

&),,£^

jfe*
&X&-

A ft*

UK FIELOSOBRIETY TESTS: (Describe subject's actions)

1. ^ M t f < ^ - fifitrt

Ykyee*

JOT- dt/6

&UAJA{£.

&$,**<?-

for

- &*1fi<LT

a/>£+*jjL!A &/££> . T&ac+isb

AM-

Were tests demonstrated by nfficer? J/fi-&
IX.

*>*l «*f=/

*S AiA&r

0/&jttr M/te*i yh

77/7^-

Subject's ability to follow Instructions FAI£-

&*+uk

- A<JX?A

SEARCHES

A.

Vehicle:
Was subject's vehicle searched?
When?
Evidence

Where?.

Person who performed the search
B.

,

Subject:
Was subject's person seached?
Where?.
When?
Evidence Found
Person who performed the search
-

X.. ytfFTSMICAL
A&tmCAL TESTJ
TEST§>0 / o r Mrs.
i/£JP t&rT*''
do you understand that you are under arrest for
driving under the influence of alchohol (drugs)? Response, (if any) / / a f t fiP fJ^cSf\
I hereby request that you submit to a chemical testtodetermine the alcohol (drug) content of your
blood. I request that you take a
A^C^^rrrtest.
(blood-breath-urine)
£3-

The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was
administered:
Results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the
existence of a blood alcohol content or presence of drugs sufficient to render you
incapable of safely driving a vehicle can, result in suspension or revocation of your
license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle.
Is your response to my request that you submit to a chemical test? Response:/

mo

e*j +*& 0/^

k^f\<M<*j?

PG/JT' U^tjg

.

Did subject submit to a chemical test? ! / # ? >
Test Administered by
.fc}*j6af
VC&
When?
A/fitf
Results
*/ ^ 3

Type of test
/5<££#rM
Where?
tOt &#?7B*iJ
Was subject notified of results?

(If the subject refuses the test, read the following)

rf-The following admonition was given by me to the subject:
If you refuse the test, It will not be given, however I must warn you that If you refuse,
your license or permit to drive a motor vehicle can be revoked for one year with no
provision for a limited driver's license. After you have taken this test, you will be
permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer a test at your own expense,
In addition to the one I have requestad you to submit to, so long as it does no delay the
lest or tests requested by me. Upon your request, I will make available to you the results
of the test if you take it.

A

n

(IT me suojeci claims me ngnx 10 remain snent or me ngm to counsel, reao me Toiiowmg:)

•M-

The following admonition was given by me to the subject:

Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent
law which is civil In nature and separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain
silent does not give you the right to refuse to take the test. You do not have the right to
have counsel during the test procedure. Unless you submit to the test I am requesting, I
will consider that you have refused to take the test. I warn you that if you refuse to take
the test, your driver's license can be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited
license.
XL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
Was subject advised of the following rights? i/££
When?
~0//9
By Whom? ff, tdf/fnt'T
Where? {» V OAIJAJLI
_ _ j b f i T Y o u have the right to remain silent.
**<£ Anything you say can and will be used against you In a court of law.
>u have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being
questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you
before any questioning, If you wish one.
If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop
answering questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during
questioning.
Were the following waiver questions asked?
1^ 1. Do you understand each ol these rights I have explained to you?

Response

fr^,

r&ny mutif

Having these rights In mind, do you wish to talk to us now?
Response
INTERVIEW:
Were you operating a vehicle?
Where were you going?
What street or highway were you on?.
Direction of travel?
Where did you start from?
When?
What time is It now?
What is today's date?
Date of week?
(Actual time
Date
Day
What city or county are you In now?

7s
P
r*

Have you been drinking?
What?
How much?
Where?
When did you have your first drink?
,
Last drink?
Are you under Jhe influence of an alcoholic beverage (drugs) now?

Are you taking tranquilizers, pills, medicines or drugs of any kind?
(What kind? get sample)
When did you have the last dose?
Are you III?
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions:)
Were you Involved in an accident today?
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident?
If so, what?
When?
How much?
:

A 1%

**•
r*>
••

ZXJ

fe
"TO
rO

^
1/3

m^m

_J5L. 2
7B

Kit. OTHER OCCURRENCES OR FACTS:
))AS/AJ*

(III.

SfSssJi

«)~<L

dl&A^j

t>Ajrst_

ATTACHED DOCUMENTS
I have attached the following documents to this report:
1.fe^-eopyof citation/temporary license
2. ^Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit.
3. • Traffic accident report.
4. D Other documents (specify) / / / r e * 7T6J- /2E<s*h

V&4£ trrtouuk

-fester

AJA*±) .

/ <bJS6<_

.__

ULT

f&»~r£ / ^ A )

D a t « ^ / - / f - £ ^ Tim>
*>/da
IV.
UTHORIZED ENDORSING SIGNATURE

Rapftrt was completed.

certify and swear that I am a sworn Utah peace officer and that I have prepared the above report form and thai
le information on the report form and the attached documents are true and correct to my knowledge and beliel
nd that the report form was prepared in the regular course of my duties. It is my belief the subject was in vioiatior
f section 41-6-44 U.C.A. at the date, time and place specified iivfhis report.

j&L
Signature of Peace Officer
Law Enforcement Agency:
/(//.f^fa
Date: A / ^ / ? r
Time:__j2£a5TATEOFUTAH^. .,
IOUNTY OF ^Cf(f-

. y
/<*&/&*

ISS.
)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this / '

day
\J&*n
lay of
of, J^J**n

NOTARY PUBLIC
f
Residing at:
£sejt~

^19i^s

^n

*
3c**fe*

Ay Commission Expires:

The original of this form must be sent within five (5) days of the arrest of thevsubject to:
Officer of Driver License Services
4501 South 2700 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119

M°<

INTOXILYZER TEST RECORD
ICOHOL m»i.ooo INTOXIf YZER PRINT CODE

A - A I R BLANK
B - BREATH
C - CALIBRATOR (Simulator)
OBSERVED SUBJECT
FOR REOUIRED OBSERVATION
PERIOD AND FOLLOWED
CHECK LIST

<//«.)
OPERATOR'«

1

a v 0> I

0
'J

J
1

INITIAL

INTOXILYZER

* ?- /S> 9 ^r^

1

4

INTOXILYZER

0

SERIAL

/J<?~

fr\

/ / ^ A . |

LOCATION

AJ

NUMBER

<V

'/SsftfTT

SUBJECT

S

NAME

TIME FIRST OBSERVED

TIME TEST STARTED

< y/JL.u*<:.CJ
OPERATOR-

J

&/

ADDITIONAL Sltf 0RMAT10N AjyD/OR REMARKS

V6
22

UJ

**
CO

CO

CM
—J

a.

5i

•

I 4^1

"

^^

«fe • »

-J t t

••

: .

?. o > .$

tqo&5

Aio.

*

>

•

ADDENDUM VII
District Court Findings and Conclusions

DAVID L . WILKINSON, No. 3472
Attorney General
BRUCE M. HALE, No 1 2 9 8
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
A t t o r n e y s for Respondent
Room 236 S t a t e C a p i t o l
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84114
Telephone:
(801) 5 3 3 - 7 6 0 6
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROD N. TRIPLETT,

)

Petitioner,
VS.
FRED C. SCHWENDIRAN, C h i e f ,
Driver License Services,
D e p a r t m e n t of P u b l i c S a f e t y ,
S t a t e of U t a h ,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER
C a s e No.

C85-1105

)

T h i s m a t t e r h a v i n g come b e f o r e t h e C o u r t on S e p t e m b e r
5 , 1 9 8 6 , and t h e p a r t i e s b e i n g r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e i r

respective

c o u n s e l and t h e C o u r t h a v i n g r e c e i v e d and r e v i e w e d t h e r e c o r d
t h e D e p a r t m e n t of P u b l i c S a f e t y ,

S t a t e of U t a h and a d m i n i s -

t r a t i v e hearing in the above-entitled matter,
complaint alleging t h a t the Office
arbitrary

of

and

plaintiff's

of D r i v e r L i c e n s e S e r v i c e s was

and c a p r i c i o u s under t h e Utah O p e r a t o r 1 s L i c e n s e

U t a h Code Ann. §§ 4 1 - 2 - 1 9 . 6 and 4 1 - 2 - 2 0 , t h e C o u r t b e i n g
a p p r i s e d i n t h e p r e m i s e s now m a k e s

Act,

fully

its:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The C o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e a g e n c y r e c o r d shows

there is substantial,

competent evidence t o support t h e

Azi

that

findings

of the hearing o f f i c e r of the Department of Public Safety.

There

i s a residuum of evidence and the Court finds that the p l a i n t i f f
was l e g a l l y arrested for "driving under the influence of a l c o hol."
2.

The Court further finds that a l l of the elements of

Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6 were proven before the Agency.

The

Court s p e c i f i c a l l y finds that the evidence before the Agency i s
competent and shows that the arresting officer had reasonable
grounds t o believe that p l a i n t i f f may have been in v i o l a t i o n of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44, arrested him, requested that he take an
intoxilyzer t e s t , and advised the p l a i n t i f f that a result i n d i cating a blood alcohol content, by weight, of .08% or more shall
and can r e s u l t in the suspension or revocation of the person's
l i c e n s e or p r i v i l e g e to operate a motor v e h i c l e , that a chemical
t e s t Was voluntarily agreed t o by p l a i n t i f f ,

and that i t was

properly given by a c e r t i f i e d operator showing r e l i a b l y a result
of .08% or above of alcohol by weight in p l a i n t i f f ' s blood.
3.

The Court further finds that the DUI report was

properly signed, notarized, countersigned and forwarded t o the
Office of Driver License Services within five days of the arrest,
that p l a i n t i f f requested a timely hearing which was held with the
plaintiff,

as well as the o f f i c e r , offering sworn testimony.
4.

The hearing was granted prior to 30 days from the

date of the arrest, and the statute grants the p l a i n t i f f

the

opportunity to appeal to t h i s Court for a hearing on the record

-2-
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and a determination of whether or not t h e Department was a r b i t r a r y or c a p r i c i o u s .
5.

The a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r gave sworn testimony before

the Department t o the contents of the DUI Report Form and h i s
grounds t o believe t h a t the p e t i t i o n e r was driving while under
the i n f l u e n c e .

The Court f i n d s t h a t he was c e r t i f i e d to give

breath t e s t s with the i n t o x i l y z e r , t h a t he used a c h e c k l i s t and
had no problems with the machine.

The i n t o x i l y z e r machine was

checked t o show t h a t i t was working properly on January 1 5 , 1985,
by a c e r t i f i e d breath t e s t t e c h n i c i a n .

The p e t i t i o n e r tooJc an

i n t o x i l y z e r examination on t h a t machine on January 19, 1985.
The Court f i n d s t h a t no subsequent t e c h n i c i a n ' s
a f f i d a v i t was presented t o t h e hearing o f f i c e r

t o show t h a t t h e

i n t o x i l y z e r machine was checked after the t e s t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
The Court, finds t h a t the hearing o f f i c e r could reasonably
presume'the machine t o s t i l l be r e l i a b l e and in working order and
t h e r e s u l t s were t h e r e f o r e , properly admissible before the
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e department without the f u r t h e r foundation of a
l a t e r t e s t of the machine.
6.
suspended.

Pursuant t o § 41-2-19.6 the p l a i n t i f f ' s l i c e n s e was
The p l a i n t i f f

appealed t h a t adverse decision t o t h i s

Courx for a review pursuant t o Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-19.6 and
41-2-20.
Having made the foregoing findings of f a c t , the Court
now makes i t s :

-3-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The Court concludes t h a t t h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l

competent evidence t o support the D e p a r t m e n t s determination t o
s u s t a i n the Notice of I n t e n t i o n t o Suspend p l a i n t i f f ' s

privilege

t o operate a v e h i c l e in t h e S t a t e of Utah served upon p l a i n t i f f
when he was a r r e s t e d due process was granted.
2.

There was competent evidence t o support t h e

A d m i n i s t r a t i v e f i n d i n g s , and the Court concludes t h a t the
hearing o f f i c e r had reasonable grounds t o believe t h a t the
p l a i n t i f f may have been in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 41*6-44,
and in a d d i t i o n , t h a t t h e r e were r e l i a b l e t e s t r e s u l t s which
i n d i c a t e d a blood alcohol content of .08% or g r e a t e r in t h e
p l a i n t i f f , or t h a t the p l a i n t i f f

had been operating a motor

v e h i c l e under the influence of alcohol rendering him incapable
of s a f e l y driving t h e same.
3.

The Court concludes t h a t the i n t o x i l y z e r machine

was r e l i a b l e and the r e s u l t s admissible before the Department,
pursuant t o t h e presumption s e t f o r t h in Utah Code Ann. §§ 4 1 - 6 44.5 ana 4 4 . 3 , and Murray City v. H a l l , 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah
1983): Yacht Club v. Ut. Liquor Control Corner 681 P.2d 1227 (Utah
1984).

4.

The Court f u r t h e r concludes t h a t , under the d e f i n i -

t i o n s of a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i c i o u s given in Utah Department of
Administrative S e r v i c e s v. Public Service Commission, 65 8 P.2d
601, the Department of P u b l i c S a f e t y ' s d e c i s i o n was not a r b i t r a r y
or c a p r i c i o u s .
-4-
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The Court having made the foregoing f i n d i n g s of

fact

and c o n c l u s i o n s of law f now makes the f o l l o w i n g :
ORDER
1.

The d e c i s i o n of the Department of P u b l i c S a f e t y f

O f f i c e of Driver License S e r v i c e s , i s s u s t a i n e d and p l a i n t i f f ' s
d r i v i n g p r i v i l e g e s are t o be suspended or revoked as required by
law*
DATED t h i s Q%n

day of J]**-

# 198^

/

A>^vw*-t».»'v

DISTRICT CbtJRT JUDGE

Approved as t o form:

JOSEPH C. FRATTO
Attorney for P e t i t i o n e r

-5-
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f^lC^f<4.n.^^^*i.

ADDENDUM VIII
Murray City v. Hall Emphasized Excerpts

g-xc+r-p-ts \eAifMfjzeoP
1320 Ut*h

663 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 3 ' V (uT*A

stances of their preparation were such as
to indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under subsection (1)
and the provisions of subsection (2) have
been met, there shall be a presumption
that the test results are valid and further
foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary.
[ll f 12] Section 41-6-44.3 is merely a
codification of the findings necessary to
establish a proper foundation for the introduction of breathalyzer evidence. It is a
legislative recognition of the universal acceptance of the reliability of such evidence.
Cf.t e.g., People v. (Sower, 42 N.Y.2d 117,
397 N.Y.Sid 368, 366 N.E.2d 69 (1977) (discussing the widespread acceptance of the
reliability of the breathalyzer). The enactment of § 41-6-44.3 evinces an intent by
the Legislature to relieve the State of Utah
and other governmental entities of the financial burden of calling as a witness in
every DUI case the public officer responsible for testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer equipment The accuracy of the
breathalyzer equipment depends on both
the proper functioning of the breathalyzer
machine itself and the proper compounding
of chemicals in the ampoules. The regulations enacted by the Commissioner of Public
Safety pursuant to § 41-6-44.3(1) require
both a calibration of the machine and a
testing of the ampoules. Thus, in place of
the officer's testimony, § 41-6-44.3 permits
the admission of affidavits regarding the
3. The appellant contends that § 41-6-443 is
inapplicable to the ampoules. We disagree.
The ampoules are such an integral part of the
breathalyzer equipment that § 41-6—44.3
would serve no purpose if it did not encompass
the ampoules.
4. The dissent claims that such findings are implicit or that the burden was on the defendant
to take exception thereto. The defendant did
object at the trial level to the admission of the
breathalyzer results on the basis of lack of
foundation.
Furthermore,
§ 41-6-443(3)
states that, before the court will presume the
validity of the breathalyzer results, a judge
must find compliance with subsections (1) and
(2). We will not imply such findings, especially
when the admission of evidence under § 41-644.3 intrudes upon an accused's constitutional

A zu>

!1SfS)

maintenance df a specific breathalyzer as
evidence of tbfc proper functioning of that'
breathalyzer machine and the accuracy of
the ampoules.* However, prior to the acceptance of those affidavits to establish a
presumption of the validity of the test results, § 41-6-44.3 requires an affirmative
finding by the trial court that (1) the calibration and testing for accuracy of the
breathalyzer and the ampoules were performed in accordance with the standards
established by the Commissioner of Public
Safety, (2) the affidavits were prepared in
the regular course of the public officer's
duties, (3) tha| they were prepared contemporaneously i i t h the act, condition or
event, and (4) the "source of information
from which rriade and the method and circumstances of their preparation were such
as to indicate their trustworthiness." The
record is devoid of any such findings.4 In
fact, the agreed statement of the facts
states that *|[n}o testimony was elicited
with respect t^> the accuracy of the machine
or the trustworthiness of the chemicals
used." Moreover, the affidavits proffered
as evidence ii> satisfaction of the requirements of § 4J—6—44.3 are inadmissible because they show on their face that the
affiants do ndt attest from their own personal knowledge.*
Consequently, the results of the breathalyzer tests were erroneously admitted because they lacked proper foundation. The
conviction and judgment of the trial court
are therefore vacated and set aside and the
case is remanded for a new trial.
right of confrontation. Moreover, the affidavits in this case pertaining to the testing of the
breathalyzer on September 4th and 12th of
1979 were subscribed and sworn to on Septem*
ber 26, 1979, thereby showing that they were
not prepared contemporaneously with the testing of the breathalyzer as required by the statute.
5. The dissent suggests that the affiants do attest from personal knowledge. The affidavits
state that Ihe breathalyzer "was properly
checked according to the standards established
by the Utah J>epanment of Public Safety
Nowhere do the affiants state their basis for
that statement. They do not state that they
personally performed the testing. Absent such
a statement, the affidavits are inadmissible.

MURRAY C T r. HALL
Ole*s6G3P.2d

On remand for a new trial, we are required to "pass upon and determine all
questions of law involved in the case
presented on appeal and necessary to the
final determination of the case." Utah
R.Civ.R 76(a). We therefore address the
appellant's claims regarding hearsay and
his constitutional right of confrontation.
Section 41-6-44.3 appears to be patterned after the "Business Entries" exception to the hearsay rule. See Utah R.Evid.
63(13). See generally A. Polasky & F. Paulson, Business Entries—From Common Law
to the New Uniform Rules of Evidence
(With a Glance at the Utah Development), 4
Utah LRev. 327 (1955). Both § 41-6-44.3
and Rule 63(13) require that the document
or memorandum' be prepared in the regular
course of the public officer's duties or business and that it be prepared contemporaneously with the act, condition or event In
addition, both require that the "source [or
sources] of information from which rnade
and the method and circumstances of their
preparation were such as to indicate their
trustworthiness." See U.C.A., 1953, § 416-44.3; Utah RJBvid. 63(13). Thus, § 416-44.3 appears to be a specific codification
of the business entries exception to the
hearsay rule.
[13] We hold that, so long as there is
compliance with the mandates of the statute, namely, contemporaneous preparation
in accordance with established standards, in
the regular course of the officer's duties,
and indications of trustworthiness, the affidavits regarding the maintenance of a
breathalyzer machine are admissible under
§ 41-6-44.3 as a valid statutory exception
to the hearsay rule. As such, those affidavits establish a rebuttable presumption that
the breathalyzer machine was functioning
properly. See U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-44.3(3).
Our conclusion is supported by similar decisions in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Wester v. St*te, Alaska, 528 P.2d 1179 (1974);
Stale v. Hudes, 128 N J.Super. 589, 321 A.2d
275 (1974); State v. Walker, 53 Ohio St2d
192, 374 N.E.2d 132 (1978); State v. Woodward, 1 Or.App. 338, 462 P.2d 685 (1969).

AZ1
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[14] The appellant also claims that
§ 41-6-44.3 permits the introduction of evidence in violation of his constitutional right
of confrontation. Although we have decided that § 41-6-44.3 is a valid statutory
exception to the hearsay rule, introduction
of evidence under § 41-6-44.3 may still be
in violation of an accused's constitutional
right of confrontation. See State v. Anderson, Utah, 612 P^d 778, 785 n. 31 (1980)
(citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90
S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)). With
respect to the right of confrontation, this
Court has stated:
Classically, the primary object of the
constitutional right of confrontation is to
prevent depositions and ex parte affidavits from being used against the accused
at trial in lieu of a persona) examination
and cross-examination of the witness
against him. When confrontation is
available the accused has an opportunity,
not only of testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness, but
of compelling him to stand face-to-face
with the jury in order that they may look
at him and judge by his demeanor and
the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. Encompassed in this right of confrontation
is the procedural right of cross-examination and the recognition of certain procedural rights regarding the exclusion of
extra judicial [sic] statements, similar to
those found protected by evidentiary
rules excluding hearsay evidence.
State v. Anderson, supra, at 785 (citations
omitted). However, it is well recognized
that the accused's right of confrontation is
not absolute. See, e.g., State v. Maestas,
Utah, 564 P.2d 1386 (1977). In certain in~
stances, it must yield to legitimate governmental interests. See, e.g, State v. Walker,
supra, 53 Ohio St2d at 199, 374 N.E2d at
136-37.
[15] The enactment of § 41-6-44.3
manifests an intent by the Legislature^to
relieve the State of Utah and other governmental entities of the financial burden and*
inconvenience of calling as a witness in
every DUI case the public officer responsible for testing the accuracy of the breatha-
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Jyzer machine and the ampoules. See trator of the critne charged is not reviewaStroupe v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 243, 207 ble. It raises an issue of sufficiency of the
S.E.2d 894 (1974). Such a concern is a evidence rather than a question of constitulegitimate eovemmental interest Section tional dimension. Therefore, the district
41-6-44.3, devised to further that interest, court's decision thereon is final and is not
constitutes a very limited intrusion upon an reviewable by this Court See State v. Tayaccused's right of confrontation. The stat- lor, Utah, 664 ?M 439 (1983); Utah Const
ute does not make the documents conclusive art VIII, § 9;| U.CJL, 1953, § 78-3-5
evidence that the breathalyser was func- "(Supp.1981).
I
tioning properly. See U.CJL, 1953, § 41^"" The judgment of the trial court is re6-44.3(3). In fact if an accused feels that versed and the case is remanded for a new
the machine was not functioning properly trial in accordance with this opinion.
or wants to prove noncompliance with the
standards established by the Commissioner
OAKS and HOjWE, JJ., concur.
of Public Safety, he/she can subpoena the
STEWART, J.,| concurs in the result
public officer responsible for testing the
HALL, Chief Justice (concurring and disaccuracy of the breathalyzer and the ampoules. See U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-14. See senting):
also Stroupe v. Commonwealth, supra. If
I join the Court in upholding the constituthe appellant wished to challenge the accu- tionality of the challenged statutes and orracy of the breathalyzer in this case, he dinances. However, I do not agree that
could have subpoenaed or taken the deposi- defendant is entitled to a new trial.
tion of the person who calibrated the
In granting a new trial, the majority of
breathalyzer and tested the ampoules in the Court reaches out and decides an issue
question. The appellant apparently chose not raised at trijal nor raised on appeal.
not to do so.
With the exception of the unmeritorious
Thus, given (I) the legitimate governmental interest in not having to produce in
every DUI case the public officer responsible for testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer and the ampoules, and (2) the alternative means available to an accused to crossexamine and confront such a witness, we
hold that § 41-6-44.3 does not violate the
appellant's constitutional right of confrontation when all of its requirements are met
See State v. Walker, supra. See also People
v. Tenorio, 197 Colo. 137,590 PJ2d 952 (1979)
(stating that there is no violation of an
Accused's right of confrontation where the
evidence is shown to be trustworthy and
reliable). However, as previously discussed,
the mandate of § 41-6-44.3 was not met in
the present case. Therefore, the results of
the breathalyzer test were erroneously admitted.
III.
[16] The appellant's final assertion of
error regarding the prosecution's failure to
identify the appellant as being the perpe-
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identification issue, defendants contentions
on appeal are directed solely to the constitutionality of U.CpL, 1953, § 41-6-44.3.
which permits the! introduction of documentary evidence of acts, conditions or events
to prove the accuracy of the instrument
commonly referred to as the "breathalyzer." Defendant attacks the statute on the
grounds that it denies the rights of confrontation and equal protection.
Defendant has rtever contended that the
documentary evidence failed to meet the
foundational requirements of the statute, or
that the trial court failed to make the findings required by t^e statute before receiving the evidence bearing upon the accuracy
of the "breathalyzer." No such issue having been raised atj trial, and no issue pertaining thereto having been raised on this
appeal, 1 do not agree with the majority of
the Court that "th* record is devoid of any
such findings." Oh the contrary, it is implicit in the record before us that the trial
judge made such findings and thereby satisfied himself that the proper foundation had
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sn laid for the introduction of the breathe r evidence. Furthermore, it was not
aimbent upon the court, by statute or
lerwise, to make written findings, and
en if he did not vocalize his findings in
pport of his decision to admit the evince, it was incumbent upon the defendant
take exception thereto, if for no other
ison than to dispel any notion of invited
•or.
I am also unable to follow the reasoning
the majority that the affidavits profred in evidence were inadmissible since
ey were not made from the standpoint of
rsonal knowledge. My reading of the
fidavits reveals that they were executed
the three Highway Patrol troopers who
rformeo the testing of the breathalyzer
r accuracy and that they were executed in
eir capacity as "Breath test technicians."
they did not personally perform the testg, their affidavits at least support the
ct that they personally observed the perrmance of the tests by others. In any
ent, the sufficiency of the affidavits not
>ving been challenged in the trial court,
at issue is not before the Court.1
In regard to the assertion of the majority
at § 41-6-44.3 requires documentary evince to be prepared contemporaneously
ith the testing of the "breathalyzer,*' I
rid no such provision therein. What is
quired by the statute is set forth in subctions (2) and (3), which read as follows:
(2) In any action or proceeding in which
it is material to prove that a person was
driving or in actual physical control of a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or driving with a blood alcohol content of .10% or greater, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts,
conditions or events to prove that the
analysis and accuracy of the instrument
were made pursuant to standards established in subsection (1) shall be admissible
if:
(a) The judge finds that they were
made in the regular course of the investigation at or about the time of the
act, condition or event; and
Franklin Financial v. Ponderosa Associates,

A-zfl

(b) The source of the information fr
which made and the method and t
cumstances of their preparation w<
such as to indicate their trust wort
ness.

(3) If the judge finds that the standai
established under subsection (1) and 1
provisions of subsection (2) have be
met, there shall be a presumption tl
the test results are valid and furt)
foundation for introduction of evidence
unnecessary. [Emphasis added.]
I would affirm the judgment of the tr
co^rt in its entirety.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
William W. CASTONGUAY,
Defendant and Appellant
No. 18000.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 9, 1983.
Defendant was convicted in the Four
District Court, Juab County, Allen B. Sc
ensen, J., of attempted first-degree murde
and he appealed. The Supreme Cour
Howe, J., held that evidence was insufi
cient to sustain conviction.
Conviction and sentence set aside.
Hall, CJ., dissented and filed opinioi

1. Homicide *=>256
To sustain information accusing d<
fendant of attempted first-degree murdc
for purpose of avoiding or preventing ai
rest, State had burden to prove beyon
et Ml., Utah, 659 ?2d )O40 (1983).

